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Abstract
Many biological and cognitive systems do not operate deep
into one or other regime of activity. Instead, they exploit criti-
cal surfaces poised at transitions in their parameter space. The
pervasiveness of criticality in natural systems suggests that
there may be general principles inducing this behaviour. How-
ever, there is a lack of conceptual models explaining how em-
bodied agents propel themselves towards these critical points.
In this paper, we present a learning model driving an embodied
Boltzmann Machine towards critical behaviour by maximizing
the heat capacity of the network. We test and corroborate the
model implementing an embodied agent in the mountain car
benchmark, controlled by a Boltzmann Machine that adjust
its weights according to the model. We find that the neural
controller reaches a point of criticality, which coincides with
a transition point of the behaviour of the agent between two
regimes of behaviour, maximizing the synergistic information
between its sensors and the hidden and motor neurons. Finally,
we discuss the potential of our learning model to study the
contribution of criticality to the behaviour of embodied living
systems in scenarios not necessarily constrained by biological
restrictions of the examples of criticality we find in nature.
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Introduction
The application of notions of self-organization and complex
systems to psychology and cognitive science has increased
during the last decades. Recently, some contributions in this
field have obtained sets of indicators of critical behaviour
(long-range correlations, fractal scaling, etc.) to character-
ize different domains of cognitive activity (Chialvo, 2010;
Van Orden, Hollis, & Wallot, 2012; Dixon, Holden, Mir-
man, & Stephen, 2012). Although comparing experimentally
measurable quantities with the parameters of models of self-
organized criticality allows to establish analogies between
models and observed phenomena, the connection between
the empirical indicators and mechanistic models is often thin
(Wagenmakers, van der Maas, & Farrell, 2012). Mechanis-
tic theories, accounting for the behaviour of the system in
terms of its parts and their interactions (Bechtel & Richard-
son, 2010) can provide useful perspectives on the study of
complex notions as criticality that the majority of current em-
pirical explanations do not have incorporated.
Interestingly, in the past few years, large sets of biologi-
cal real data have allowed to characterize -using mechanis-
tic models- how the behaviours of different biological sys-
tems (e.g. networks of neurons, antibody segments or flocks
of birds) are poised near a critical point in their parameter
space (Mora & Bialek, 2011). This is a great step towards the
development of deeper theoretical principle behind the be-
haviour of biological and cognitive system. However, beyond
the importance of these models explaining the emergence of
criticality in specific experimental data, we suggest that a
complementary perspective could tackle the development of
‘conceptual models’ in order to explain how organisms are
driven towards critical behaviour in a more abstract level.
Conceptual models are defined in terms of a set of general
mechanisms and generic processes but expressed in abstract
frameworks working as ‘proofs of concept’ (Barandiaran &
Chemero, 2009) that can be the support of future experiments.
In this paper, we propose a conceptual model describing
a mechanisms driving an embodied agent towards critical
points of its parameter space. We make use of concepts from
statistical mechanics to base our model not on specific config-
urations of the parameters of the agent, but instead we exploit
macroscopic variables to drive the system to transition points
between qualitatively different regimes of behaviour. Driv-
ing synthetic agents to criticality may offer the opportunity to
clarify what is its contribution of in different contexts. In the
study of cognitive processes, we always find that criticality
appears entangled with other features of adaptive behaviour
(e.g. perception, prediction, learning) in agents dealing with
complex environments. A mechanism poising agents in criti-
cality in different scenarios may help understanding what are
the contributions of criticality ‘by-itself’ or how is criticality
related to other phenomena.
In order to do it, we first introduce a Boltzmann Machine as
the simplest statistical mechanics model showing correlations
between elements of a network and derive a learning model
driving the system towards critical points. The model will ex-
ploit the heat capacity of the system, as a macroscopic prop-
erty that works as a proxy for criticality (when the heat capac-
ity diverges the Boltzmann Machine is in a critical point). Af-
ter that, we test our learning model in an embodied agent con-
trolling a Mountain Car (a classic reinforced learning testbed)
finding that it is able to drive both the neural controller and
the behaviour of the agent to a transition point in the parame-
ter space between qualitatively different behavioural regimes.
Finally, we discuss the possible applications of our model to
contribute to the development of deeper principles governing
biological and cognitive systems.
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Driving a neural controller towards a critical
point
We propose a learning model self-organizing the parameters
of a Boltzmann Machine, in order to drive the system towards
states of criticality. We take advantage of the fact that at criti-
cal points, derivatives of thermodynamic quantities as the en-
tropy may diverge (Mora & Bialek, 2011). An example of
this is the heat capacity, whose divergence is a sufficient con-
dition for criticality (though not a necessary one). We define
our network as a Boltzmann Machine (Ackley, Hinton, & Se-
jnowski, 1985) following a maximum entropy distribution:
P(s) =
1
Z
e−βE(s) (1)
where the energy of each state is defined in terms of the bias
and couplings of the state of each neuron.
E(s) =−(∑
i
hisi+∑
i, j
Ji jsis j) (2)
The states si can take values of +1 or −1 and the couplings
Ji j and bias hi can take continuous values.
In order to define a learning rule adjusting the values of
hi and Ji j we define a gradient climbing rule for maximizing
the value of the heat capacity, with the intent of driving the
system to critical points depicted by a singularity of the heat
capacity. Though, the heat capacity of the global state of the
system depends on global variables of the system (e.g. the
energy of the system) and thus we cannot define a gradient
climbing rule based only in local information. Instead, we can
define the heat capacity of the system from the path entropy
of each neuron depicting transition between states, which is
defined by the probability:
P(s′i|s) =
eβis
′
iHi
2cosh(βHi)
, Hi = hi+∑
j
J jis j (3)
where s is the state of the system at time t and s′ at time t+1
and βi is now ascribed to the transitions of an individual neu-
ron1. Path entropy is defined as the entropy of the transitions
of the state of a neuron i,
S(s′i|s) =−∑
s
P(s)∑
s′i
log(P(s′i|s)) ·P(s′i|s) =
=−∑
s
P(s)(βiHitanh(βiHi)− log(2cosh(βiHi))
(4)
From the path entropy we can define the heat capacity asso-
ciated with the path entropy of neuron i as
Ci =−βi ∂S(s
′
i|s)
∂βi
=∑
s
P(s)(
H2i β2i
cosh(βiHi)2
+
+βi(siHi−〈siHi〉)(βiHitanh(βiHi)− log(2cosh(βiHi)))
(5)
1Using individual values of βi allows to derive a learning rule
that is only dependent on local variables
In our model, the value of the thermodynamic beta defines
the temperature of the system βi = 1kBTi , where kB is the Boltz-
mann constant and Ti the temperature associated with each
neuron. Nevertheless, since the temperature here has no real-
world meaning, βi just corresponds to a global rescaling of
the parameters of the neuron by multiplying them by a con-
stant value. Thus, we determine a working temperature defin-
ing βi = 1.
Considering Fi = Hitanh(Hi) − log(2cosh(Hi), Gi =
H2i
cosh(Hi)2
+ siHiFi and Ki = 〈siHi〉 and knowing that ∂P(s)∂hi =
(si− 〈si〉)P(s) and ∂P(s)∂Ji j = (sis j − 〈sis j〉)P(s) we derive the
learning rules that climb the gradient of Ci and drive the sys-
tem towards critical points as:
∂Ci
∂hi
= 〈∂Gi
∂hi
〉+ 〈siGi〉−〈si〉〈Gi〉− ∂Ki∂hi 〈Fi〉−
−Ki(〈∂Fi∂hi 〉+ 〈siFi〉−〈si〉〈Fi〉)
∂Ci
∂J ji
= 〈∂Gi
∂J ji
〉+ 〈sis jGi〉−〈sis j〉〈Gi〉− ∂Ki∂J ji 〈Fi〉−
−Ki(〈 ∂Fi∂J ji 〉+ 〈sis jFi〉−〈sis j〉〈Fi〉)
(6)
where
∂Fi
∂hi
=
Hi
cosh(Hi)2
,
∂Fi
∂J ji
=
His j
cosh(Hi)2
,
∂Gi
∂hi
=
2Hi(1−Hitanh(Hi))
cosh(Hi)2
+ siFi+ siHi
∂Fi
∂hi
,
∂Gi
∂J ji
=
2His j(1−Hitanh(Hi))
cosh(Hi)2
+ sis jFi+ siHi
∂Fi
∂J ji
,
∂Ki
∂hi
= 〈si〉+ 〈s2i Hi〉−〈si〉Ki
∂Ki
∂J ji
= 〈sis j〉+ 〈s2i s jHi〉−〈sis j〉Ki
(7)
In the following section, we use this learning rule to drive
the neural controller of an embodied agent towards a critical
point. In order to do so, we need to take into account the
environment during learning. If we consider two intercon-
nected Boltzmann Machines, (one being the neural controller
and other being the environment) Equation 6 holds perfectly
if we only apply it to the values of i and j corresponding to
units of the neural controller. In our case, we will not use a
Bolzmann Machine as an environment but instead we will use
a classic example from reinforced learning. Therefore, our
learning rule will be valid as long as the statistics of the envi-
ronment can be approximated by a Boltzmann Machine with
an arbitrary number of units. Luckily, Boltzmann Machines
are universal approximators (Montu´far, 2014). Nevertheless,
if the updating of units does not follow the rules of a Boltz-
mann Machine2, as we will see later, the approximation can
be flawed in some cases.
Embodied model: Mountain Car
In order to evaluate the behaviour of the proposed learning
model, we test it in the Mountain Car environment (Moore,
1990). This environment is a classical test bed in reinforced
learning depicting an under-powered car that must drive up a
steep hill (Figure 1). Since gravity is stronger than the car’s
engine, the vehicle must learn to leverage potential energy by
driving to the opposite hill before the car is able to make it
to the goal at the top of the rightmost hill. We simulate the
environment using the OpenAI Gym toolkit (Brockman et al.,
2016). In this environment, the horizontal position x of the
car is limited to an interval of [−1.5pi,0.5pi], and the vertical
position of the car is defined as y = sin(3x). The velocity in
the horizontal axis is updated each time step as v(t + 1) =
v(t)+ 0.001a− 0.0025cos(3x), where a is the action of the
motor which can be either −1,0,1.
Figure 1: Mountain Car environment. An under-powered car
that must drive up a steep hill by balancing itself to gain mo-
mentum.
So as to make it difficult for random agents to solve
the task, the maximum velocity of the car was limited to
[−0.045,0.045]3. With this velocity limitation, only around
a fraction of 6.30% of agents with random parameters (sam-
pled from a uniform distribution in the range [−1,1]) are able
to reach the top of the mountain in a trial of 1000 simula-
tion steps starting from a starting random position (uniformly
distributed in the region of the valley [0.4,0.6]).
We define the neural controller of the car as a Boltzmann
Machine containing 6 sensors and 6 neurons. We feed the
sensors with the horizontal and vertical acceleration of the
car, each discretized to arrays of three bits. Each sensor unit
is assigned a value of 1 if its corresponding bit is active and
−1 otherwise. Two of the car neurons are connected to the
motors, defining a = 1 if both neurons are active, a = −1 if
2For example, in our embodied model sensors values are
clamped from values in the environment, thus they influence hidden
and motor units but they are not influenced by them. In a Boltzmann
Machine, this can provoke that the distribution of states no longer
follows the Boltzmann distribution depicted by Equation 3
3Typically the Mountain Car environment restricts the velocity
of the car to the interval [−0.07,0.07]
both neurons are inactive, and a = 0 otherwise. We apply
the learning rule from Equation 6 to 10 different agents. In
order to avoid overfitting, we add an L2 regularization term
updating the parameters of the system according to the rule:
hi← hi+µ∂Ci∂hi −λhi
J ji← J ji+µ ∂Ci∂J ji −λJ ji
(8)
where µ = 0.02, λ = 0.002 and ∂Ci∂hi and
∂Ci
∂J ji
are the result
of Equation 6. Agents are initialized in the starting random
position of the environment. Hidden and motor neurons are
randomized and the initial parameters h and J are sampled
from a uniform random interval [−0.01,0.01]. The agents are
simulated for 1000 trials of 5000 steps, applying Equation
6 at the end of the trial computing the values of ∂Ci∂hi and
∂Ci
∂J ji
over that trial. Note that agents are not reseted at the end of
the trial.
Results
In this section, we analyze the behaviour of the neural con-
trollers and the behavioural patterns of the agents respect the
possibilities of their parameter space. Although figures cor-
respond to one particular agent (one of the ones reaching the
top of the mountain), most results are general to all 10 agents,
except when it is indicated otherwise. In order to compare
the agents with other behavioural possibilities, we explore the
parameter space by changing the parameter β of the agents.
Modifying the value of β is equivalent to a global rescaling
of the parameters of the agent transforming h ji← β · h ji and
J ji← β ·J ji, thus exploring the parameter space along one spe-
cific direction. For 21 values of β logarithmically distributed
in the interval [10−1,101] we simulate the 10 agents for a trial
of 106 simulation steps, after starting the agents from the ran-
dom starting position (i.e. x in an interval [0.4,0.6]) and a
initial run of 104 simulation steps. We will use the results of
those simulations for all the results in this section.
Signatures of criticality in the neural controller
Firstly, we test whether the trained agents show signatures of
critical behaviour. Counting the occurrence of each possible
state of the 12 neurons of the agents (including sensor, hidden
and motor neurons) we can compute the probability distribu-
tion of the Boltzmann Machine P(s).
We observe that all agents approximately follow a Zipf’s
law at β = 1 (Figure 2.A) for almost three decades, which is
a good agreement for the limited size of the system (note that
the possible states of the system are limited to 212 states. All
trained agents show a similar distribution close to Zipf’s law.
Secondly, as another indicator of critical points is the diver-
gence of the heat capacity of the system, we estimate the heat
capacity of hidden and motor neurons 4. The result that we
4We can do it using Equation 4 or, alternatively, using Equa-
tion 5, which involves the approximations made for designing the
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Figure 2: Signatures of criticality. (A) Ranked probability
distribution function of the inferred Ising models for the dif-
ferent frequency bands (solid line) versus a distribution fol-
lowing Zipf’s law, (i.e. P(s) = 1/rank, dashed line). We
observe a good agreement between the model and Zipf’s
law, suggesting critical scaling. (B) Heat capacity versus β
computed using Equation 4 for calculating the entropy and
derivating a cubic interpolation of the entropy function re-
spect to β (solid line) and estimation of the heat capacity us-
ing the approximation used in Equation 5 (dashed line). A
peak in heat capacity is observed near β= 1, suggesting that
the system is near a critical point. For values of β below the
critical point we observe that the heat capacity and its approx-
imation coincide, indicating that the approximation is valid
for that range.
observe (Figure 2.B) is that the heat capacity peaks around the
operating temperature (at a value slightly larger than β = 1)
that, together with the Zipf’s distribution, it suggests that the
system is operating in a regime of criticality.
Finally, if we compare the real heat capacity and the heat
capacity as seen by the learning algorithm, we can infer that
the approximation of the environment as a Boltzmann Ma-
chine works well when the parameters of the agent are not
too large (increasing β is equivalent to rescale all parameters
of the system similarly, and therefore, regularization terms
might be necessary for the learning algorithm to work cor-
rectly at least when environments are deterministic, as in this
case).
Behavioural transitions in the parameter space
What does it imply for the agent to poise its neural controller
at a critical point?
It should be remarked here that our agents are given no
explicit goal but they only tend to behavioural patterns maxi-
mizing the heat capacity of its neurons independently of this
behaviour reaches the top of the mountain or not (in fact,
only 4 of the 10 trained agents are able to climb to the top
of the mountain). Related to this, we will start exploring the
effects of transiting the critical point observing the different
behavioural modes of the agent in the parameter space. The
behaviour of the car can be described just by the position x
and speed v at different moments of time.
learning algorithm that models heat capacity ‘as seen’ by the neural
controller.
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Figure 3: Transition in behavioural regime of the agent. We
show the behaviour of an agent for an interval of 4000 steps
with values of β of 0.25 (A), 1 (B) and 4 (C), depicting the
trajectories of the car in its phase space (x versus v, top) and
the evolution of the values of x (bottom). We observe that
β = 1 is a transition point between two modes of behaviour.
(D) Average vertical position of the car 〈y〉 (solid line) and
its upper and lower quartiles (dotted lines). We observe a
transition near β = 1 where the agent reaches the top of the
mountain. Similar transitions are identified in 6 of the 10
simulated agents.
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Figure 4: Synergistic information. Synergy values
Ψ(S;M,H) (solid line), Ψ(M;S,H) (dashed line) and
Ψ(H;S,M) (dash-dot line) computed using partial informa-
tion decomposition. We find a transition from high synergy
between motor and hidden neurons about sensory informa-
tion to high synergy between sensor neurons and motor and
hidden neurons respectively near β= 1.
In Figure 3.A-C we can observe the behaviour of the car
for β= 0.25,1,4 respectively, for an interval of 4000 simula-
tion steps. If we compute the average value of y at the trial
for each value of β Figure 3.D, we observe that slightly below
the operating temperature there is a transition from agents that
are not able to reach to the top of the mountains to those that
are able to do so. More in detail, in the 4 agents that are able
to reach the top of the mountain the results are similar while
2 more agents that are not able to reach the top display a sim-
ilar transition in the average value of height y and the average
absolute velocity v of the car. The remaining 4 agents do not
show a transition in average values of basic behavioural vari-
ables although it does not preclude the possibility of another
type of less evident behavioural transition.
What is it changed in this behavioural transition? We are
interested in knowing of these behavioural regimes are quali-
tatively different and will explore this using information the-
ory to characterize how different variables of the agent inter-
act at different points of the parameter space. Specifically,
we are interested in the relation between sensor, hidden and
motor neurons, which determines the behaviour of the agent
in its environment.
But, is the agent merely reactive to sensory inputs or is
there a more complex interplay between sensor, hidden and
motor units? In order to answer this, we characterize the in-
teraction between variables using partial information decom-
position (Timme, Alford, Flecker, & Beggs, 2014) to com-
pute synergies between variables, defined as:
Ψ(Y ;X1,X2) = I(Y ;X1,X2)− I(Y ;X1)−
−I(Y ;X2)+ Imin(Y ;X1,X2)
(9)
where Y , X1 and X2 are random discrete variables, I(Y ;X)
is the mutual information between two variables and
Imin(Y ;X1,X2), defined as in (Williams & Beer, 2011), is the
redundant information that X1 and X2 share about Y . The re-
sulting synergy Ψ(Y ;X1,X2) is able to capture information of
Y that is not available from either X1 and X2 alone but from
their interaction (the classical example is the relation between
the output and inputs of an XOR gate).
Defining S, H and M as the joint distribution of sensor,
hidden and motor neurons respectively, we can analyze the
synergistic information between the distribution of the three
groups of variables. The objective is to capture how much
information emerges from the interaction between variables
instead of being contained in the variables alone.
As we observe in Figure 4, the synergy Ψ(S;H,M) be-
tween motor and hidden neurons about sensor information
peaks at values of β lower than 1, while the synergies of
hidden and motor neurons with sensor neurons, Ψ(M;S,H)
Ψ(H;S,M), increase at larger values of β, depicting a transi-
tion point at a value of β slightly lower than 1. Since the en-
vironment of the agent is completely deterministic, it seems
adequate that larger values of β (i.e. less random behaviour)
are more effective to transmit information from sensors to
other neurons, while maximum interaction between hidden
and motor neurons takes place at a place with a lower β.
Discussion
Recapitulating, we have proposed a learning model driving
an embodied agent close to critical points in the parameter
space, poising both the neural controller and the behavioural
patterns of the agent near a transition point between qualita-
tively different regimes of operation. In the case of the neural
controller, we have found that the Boltzmann Machine has
a peak in its peak capacity in a point slightly above β = 1.
However, if we analyze the synergistic interaction between
sensor, hidden and motor units of the system we find a tran-
sition at a point slightly under β = 1, which also coincides
with a point of transition between behavioural regimens in 6
of the 10 agents. These results could suggest that the system
might be finding a compromise between the critical point of
its neural controller and zones of transition in the behavioural
regimes of the agent (the former happening at higher temper-
atures and the latter at lower temperatures).
At this point, we could harken back to our original ques-
tions. Why do biological systems behave near to criticality?
What are the benefits for a biological system to move to this
special type of points? And more importantly, how can our
learning model help answer those questions?
Reviewing related literature, one finds that interpretations
about criticality are too speculative in general. For example,
Beggs (2008) hypothesizes that neural systems operating at
a critical point can optimize information processing and its
computational power. Mora and Bialek (2011) discuss the
experimental evidence of criticality in a wide variety of sys-
tems and propose that criticality could provide better defense
mechanisms against predators (in animals), gain selectivity in
response to stimuli (in auditory systems) or improved mech-
anism to anticipate attacks (in immunological systems). Nev-
ertheless, the reasoning that give support to this hypothesis is
based more on generic suggestions than on scientifically rig-
orous statements. More detailed analyses are needed to ac-
cept speculations,and our opinion is that a conceptual model
of embodied criticality in natural systems can be useful to
capture how transition points in the parameter space of behav-
ioral regimes can be found and exploited to obtain functional
advantages as the ones mentioned above. For that purpose,
rather than specific biological instances of critical phenom-
ena, we have used an abstract framework of how embodied
agents can be driven to critical points.
Furthermore, we believe that using conceptual models as
the one presented here could us to test more intriguing hy-
pothesis. For example, our general mechanism driving an
embodied neural controller to criticality has the potential of
capturing what is the contribution of criticality ‘by itself’ to
the behaviour of an adaptive agents in different scenarios, as
well as the relation between criticality and other biological
and cognitive phenomena.
On the other hand, criticality generally appears entangled
other capabilities developed by biological systems, and typi-
cally interpretations about the advantages of criticality always
refer to tangible benefits for the system (e.g. in an evolutive
level, as the source of a new range of capabilities or better
mechanism for surviving in open environments, etc.) and it
is difficult to distinguish if criticality is the cause or the con-
sequence of such effects. Notwithstanding, as we have pre-
sented here, our model does not address any particular task.
Instead, the model finds ways to drive the system to critical
points, allowing us to explore what are the effects of poising
a system to criticality under some embodied constraints, dis-
entangling the effects of criticality to other factors embedded
in real life organisms. As well, this can be connected to the
analysis particular features in animal behaviour that are inter-
preted without assuming a necessary pragmatical perspective
of analysis. For example, ‘play’ in humans and other species
does not aim to solve a specific problem, but instead it can
be simply understood as a ‘rule-breaker’ activity, breaking
the constrains of stable regimes of behaviour, even if it is not
directly required from the environment (Di Paolo, Rohde, &
De Jaegher, 2010).
Moreover, the presented model could be implemented
in more complex embodied setups, for example involving
specific tasks of adaptive behaviour adding environmental
constraints (e.g. exploration, decision-making, categori-
cal perception) or biological requirements (e.g. an internal
metabolism or other biological drives as hunger or thirst) and
observe how the compliance of these biological and cognitive
requirements interplays with the drive towards critical points
in the neural controller of the agent. Thus, we could explore
in this way how criticality can contribute to capabilities ob-
served by natural organisms.
The study of criticality in living systems has tradition-
ally rested on too speculative grounds. Today, the increas-
ing amount of high quality data together with the possibili-
ties of statistical mechanics models promises exciting routes
towards a rigorous exploration of the governing principles
of biological organisms, linking experimental evidence and
data-driven models with conceptual models exploring general
mechanisms offering general explanations of the mechanisms
driving the behaviour of these complex systems.
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